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Abstract 
What are the determinants of EU member states' policies towards the creation and design of 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)? This paper argues that members' policies can be 
understood as instances of "constrained balancing”; i.e. as attempts to balance US power after the end 
of the Cold War, which were constrained by the peculiar institutions of security policy in which 
individual members' policies had become embedded during the Cold War. The paper constructs an 
analytical framework which is informed by neorealist and historical institutionalist thought and 
which is intended to capture the interplay of the constraints and incentives for members' policies 
created by the international distribution of power and institutions of security policy. For illustrative 
purposes, this framework is briefly applied to shed light on four different aspects of British and 
German ESDP policies. 
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Introduction 
In June 1999 the Cologne European Council declared that the EU shall enhance its capability 
for intervening in crises abroad. According to the Heads of State and Government the Union 
would acquire "the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crises without prejudice to actions by NATO."1 This declaration marked both the end and 
the beginning of an extended, sometimes arduous political process. It ended lengthy 
discussions inside EU, WEU and NATO whether Europeans should create an autonomous 
capacity for military action and where it should have its organizational home. By deciding 
to create such a capacity within the EU, member states at the same time opened a new 
discussion on the exact shape of this new military dimension of the EU: how should it relate 
to NATO, how were decisions with military impact to be made, what kinds of capabilities 
should the Union acquire?2 
Especially the creation of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as this new 
dimension was soon to be termed, was an extremely contentious issue with member states 
holding highly diverging positions. The publicly most visible proponents of such a capacity 
were the French and German governments. It was a joint letter of German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand that put the issue on the agenda in 
1990. Both states continued to push for closer security and defence cooperation among 
European states in the years to come and for anchoring this cooperation within the 
European Union, yet they met with considerable resistance from several countries. 
The UK turned out to be the most outspoken opponent of intensifying European 
military cooperation and, in particular, of dealing with security and defence affairs inside 
the European Union. The British government pointed especially to the detrimental effect this 
could engender for transatlantic defence cooperation within NATO. Therefore the British 
government insisted that European security and defence collaboration take place within the 
WEU with its firmly established subordinate position vis-à-vis NATO. It was only in late 
1998 when the UK gave up this position. In a surprise move at an informal EU summit in 
Pörtschach (Austria), Tony Blair signaled the UK's willingness to create EU military 
                                                       
1 Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, 
Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, reprinted in: From St-Malo to Nice. European Defence: Core 
Documents, compiled by Maartje Rutten, Chaillot Paper 47, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 41f., 41. 
2 I will focus on the military aspect of ESDP and on what could be termed 'constitutional policies.' I will not 
include the actual deployment of military forces through ESDP because the creation and design of an institution 
will arguably be shaped by factors different from those that influence the application of the instruments it 
provides.   2 
capabilities. This was followed up by the Franco-British summit of St. Malo, which 
produced a declaration calling for the creation of an autonomous EU capacity for crisis 
response backed up by credible military forces. This, in turn, paved the way for the EU's 
Cologne decisions which set up ESDP. 
Why did member states pursue these policies? In this paper I will focus on Germany 
and Britain and develop a framework for analyzing their policies towards creation and 
design of ESDP. In developing this framework I want to adopt a perspective that has 
received only scant attention in research on ESDP. I will not look at domestic characteristics 
of states, characteristics of their governments, bureaucracies, militaries or individual 
decision-makers. Rather I want to address how two important features of international 
structure affected member state policies: the international distribution of power and 
institutions of security policy in which these states had become embedded during the Cold 
War.  
My basic argument is that British and German policies can be conceived as a 
response to constraints and incentives that stem from the international distribution of 
power, on the one hand, and specific, institutionally stabilized, traditions of foreign policy, 
on the other. British and German policies towards ESDP represent a form of “constrained 
balancing” against preponderant US power. Both states responded to the principal change 
in the international distribution of power after 1989/90, which prompted them to seek 
autonomy from the United States. However, the way they adjusted to the changes of 
1989/90 was modified, or constrained, by the respective institutions in which their security 
policies had become embedded over the course of the Cold War. 
The bulk of this paper will be devoted to the theoretical argument which I will 
develop in four successive steps. First, I will in general reflect on how international 
structures can affect foreign and security policies. It will turn out that, in contrast to 
arguments implicit in many accounts in the International Relations (IR) literature, structures 
are unlikely to determine policies. Rather, they constitute constraints and incentives to which 
states will respond but which leave certain—albeit restricted—freedom of action for states. 
Secondly I will present a highly reduced view of the structure that affects states' security 
policies. This view is borrowed from structural realism and posits that international anarchy 
creates a specific set of constraints and incentives. Due to international anarchy states are 
induced to react to unfavorable shifts in the international distribution of power, i.e. to 
engage in "balancing". In a third step I will augment this view of structure and add the 
impact of history to it. Policies in time may lead to the emergence of international 
institutions which will then affect states' calculations. Once established, institutions come   3 
with a number of benefits associated with their existence and costs related to their 
abandonment. Therefore states will be induced to stick to these institutions and, once 
institutionalized, policies will become path-dependent. Fourth, I will outline the incentive 
structure a state faces when its security policy has become embedded in a set of institutions 
and an unfavorable shift in the international distribution of power occurs. Such a state will 
be induced to pursue a form of constrained balancing: It will seek power, yet in a way that 
minimizes the costs to established security institutions. In the final section of this paper I 
will present some preliminary evidence from an analysis of British and German policies 
towards ESDP to demonstrate how a focus on these constraints and incentives can help us to 
better understand the ESDP policies of these two states. 
The general approach: linking structure to action 
Before I turn to spell out in more detail how the distribution of power and institutions of 
security policy may impact on the security policies of states, it is important to address a 
potential source of confusion. I assume that the structural context of a state will affect this 
state's foreign and security policy. This should not be confused with the assumption that 
context actually determines foreign and security policy. A determinate link between context 
and action can only be assumed under highly restrictive conditions. Arnold Wolfers (1962: 
4-19) has aptly captured this in his well-known image of the burning house. Consider a 
group of people at a party in a house and in this house a fire breaks out. The people inside 
are highly likely to leave the house as fast as they can. If the house has just a single exit and 
the exit is not blocked by the fire it is easy to predict that everyone in the house will quickly 
try to reach the exit. To understand what these people do an observer could completely 
abstract from their individual traits and refer solely to their external context – the burning 
house. Now consider however a situation in which the house is not on fire but merely 
overheated. Once again, people are likely to react to the circumstances, but they will do so in 
a less predictable fashion. Some may open the windows, some may leave the house briefly, 
some may wander around and look for a cool room etc. These actions can only be 
understood if one knows about the external circumstances, but understanding individual 
reactions also requires knowledge of individual characteristics.  
Only in extreme situations in which common basic interests are strongly affected by 
external circumstances will an analysis of external context suffice to fully account for 
individual decisions. This is easily translated to foreign policy analysis: Only in highly 
restrictive situations will international context fully account for foreign policy. It is much   4 
more likely that context will affect decisions, set basic constraints and incentives without 
actually determining policy.  
Therefore the analytical framework which I will outline below focuses on the 
constraints and incentives states face in the international system. It will not result in 
determinate predictions about foreign policies. Rather it will represent an important set of 
parameters to which foreign policies will have to react and thus make actual foreign policies 
comprehensible as responses to this set of constraints and incentives. 
Neorealism as a starting point: international anarchy as a basic constraint on security 
policy 
The analytical framework I suggest takes neorealism, or structural realism, as its starting 
point because this theory spells out some of the most basic constraints that states face in the 
international system. Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979) singles out key 
factors in the structure of the international system that affect behavioral choices of the 
primary units in this system across time and space. There is no claim that this is an 
exhaustive list of factors affecting foreign policies and international interactions or that these 
factors are dominant in any historic situation. Contrary, Waltz readily admits that there are 
other important variables and that structural features are not determinate of unit actions 
(e.g. Waltz 1986: 338). The key features of the international system's structure (anarchy and 
the international distribution of power, as will be spelled out below) affect every choice, yet 
they do not determine them.  
Waltz’s theory thus does not explain single decisions of states but identifies “the 
constraints and incentives they face” in the international system (Waltz 1982: 681). 
Neorealism rests on a rather parsimonious model of this system. It is viewed as an anarchic 
system, in which like units, willing to survive, pursue similar goals with different 
capabilities. The units that populate it are states. For the sake of the model, states are viewed 
as unitary entities that are capable of strategically pursuing fixed preferences.
3 Their most 
                                                       
3 There need not be a rationality assumption for Waltz's balance of power theory to work and Waltz (1979: 118) 
himself expressly rejects the idea of including rationality among his theory’s basic assumptions. Waltz claims 
that even if states did not calculate rationally (or at least – if not all states did so), a balance of power system 
would eventually have to emerge in any anarchic environment. This would come about by some evolutionary 
process of selection. Those states that adhere to the principles of a balance of power system will survive in the 
long run; the rest will disappear or start to emulate the strategies of their successful competitors. There can be no 
doubt, however, that Waltz's formulation of neorealism has a strong rationalist bend. His heavy reliance on 
microeconomic theory indicates an affiliation to rational man, homo oeconomicus, as his implicit concept of the 
ideal-type actor. Waltz also concedes that he has to make assumptions about actors' goals in order for his theory 
to work (units need to aim at survival) (Waltz 1979: 121) and the specification of actors' goals as basic assumption 
of a theory would make no sense if there was no implicit assumption about actors' behavior being influenced by 
a hierarchy of goals. It comes as no surprise, then, that most successive texts relying on Waltz's theory claim 
rationality to be a core assumption of neorealist theory (e. g. Elman 1996b: 43, Grieco 1995: 27). Even Legro and   5 
basic interest is that they are willing to survive. Under anarchy, however, their survival is 
precarious. There is no authority in the system that would be entitled to enforce norms and 
rules and thus to legitimately protect one state from being harmed by another. Therefore 
states have to take care of their security themselves.  
In Waltz's view, then, any anarchic system creates strong incentives for its units to 
pursue self-help strategies. In the international political realm the resource that enables 
actors to pursue self-help strategies successfully is "power". Waltz defines power in terms of 
capabilities. To determine a state’s power, its combined “economic, military, and other 
capabilities” (Waltz 1979: 131) have to be taken into account. Thus in the context of this 
conception of the international system, power is a tool of states. It has to be understood, in 
Hart's (1976) useful distinction, not as the “control over outcomes” a state can exercise, but 
as the "control over resources" at its disposal to achieve security. It is their control over 
resources that enables actors to ward off potential attacks from others and thus to achieve 
their minimal goal in an anarchic system (see also Waltz 1979: 191 f.). Power, of course, is a 
relative concept. What matters is not the control over resources by itself, but to control more 
resources than a potential opponent. If the distribution of power changes—for reasons 
exogenous to the system—the anarchic structure of the international system will clearly 
induce rational actors to react to this imbalance and to regain the power they lost relative to 
others. A policy concurring with these incentives can be called "balancing" because, from a 
systemic perspective, it contributes to redressing power imbalances. 
Balancing in this sense means that states will attempt to regain power and thus to 
gain control over a larger share of the resources in the system. But: which resources and 
what kind of control? Neorealist analyses of international politics primarily use military, 
economic and geographic indicators to measure power (Baumann et al. 2001: 44). These 
resources are regarded as "highly fungible" (Baumann et al. 2001: 43) and thus as enabling 
states to ensure their security in the international system. The second term in the definition 
of power as "control over resources" usually receives much less attention. As a matter of fact, 
most scholars tend to equate control over resources with the possession of resources. But the 
mere possession of resources does not imply that a state can use them to foster its security. A 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Moravcsik (1999), who heavily criticize that so many subsequent texts have relaxed the basic assumptions of 
paradigmatic realist texts like Waltz's Theory and introduced additional assumptions alien to realism, regard 
actor rationality as one of the two core assumption of realism and, moreover, as the “least controversial” one 
(Legro/Moravcsik 1999: 12). For a discussion of rationality in structural realism defending Waltz’s view, see 
Resende-Santos (1996: 209, n. 56).   6 
state mu st be  able  to m ake au tonomou s u se o f  them. 4 The more the use of resources is 
bound by norms or by rules which give other actors voice opportunities over their use the 
less a state can employ them freely as a means to ensure its security. This is not to say that 
states cannot violate international norms and rules or that international institutions can force 
compliant behavior on states. Yet, although non-compliance always is possible in an 
anarchic environment, it still places costs on states. These costs, in turn, constrain a state's 
freedom of action. Consequently, freedom from such constraints, i.e. the ability to make 
autonomous use of one's resources enhances a state's power. Hence autonomy is an 
ingredient of power (rather than only a consequence of it). 
Taken together a change in the distribution of power in an anarchic system would 
provide strong incentives for balancing. Those states whose relative power had been 
negatively affected by this change are induced to strive for power. Power, in turn, is 
constituted by two elements, (1) the possession of resources that can ensure a state's 
security, i.e. military, economic and geographic resources; and (2) autonomy in using these 
resources. 
From incentives to action 
These balancing incentives will substantially affect policy choices. However, the incentive 
structure is not one that would compel actors to follow single policy options. To better 
understand its character, I will briefly look at four typical kinds of action that could result 
from these incentives. We will see that context disposes actors towards some options but 
that there is no simple 1:1 ratio between incentives and policy options. There may be several 
policies that would satisfy one goal; and there may also be single policies that create 
contradictive outcomes with respect to different incentives. Thus the incentive structure will 
not necessarily result in a fully ordered ranking of policy options. Rather, it demarcates a 
space of policy options, from which actual policy options will be chosen.  
Let us look at the contours of this space more closely. What kind of actions would be 
rational for a state facing these incentives? We have seen that from a structural realist 
viewpoint states will react to changes in the distribution of power by increasing their power 
relative to a state that has gained superiority. Since power is constituted by both resources 
and autonomy in making use of them, there are two obvious strategies for balancing: 
increase your capabilities and increase your autonomy. But given the fact that power is a 
relative concept, there are two other general strategies that are just as effective: decrease 
                                                       
4 Fareed Zakaria (1998) addresses a similar problem. He asserts that actual power depends on the resources that 
a nation’s government can actually control. He focuses on the internal side of the issue, though, i.e. on the 
question to what extent the state can extract resources from domestic society.   7 
others' capabilities and decrease others' autonomy.
5 I will address these four options briefly 
in turn. 
Increasing one's own capabilities is the classic form of balancing and the most 
obvious way of increasing one's power. Most capabilities can be increased in a rather 
straightforward way: buying weapons, upgrading existing weapons' systems, putting more 
people under arms; finding ways to increase a state's GDP; increasing a state's territory 
through conquest; and pooling one's capabilities with those of allies (the classic form of 
'external balancing').  
Increasing autonomy is another obvious way of balancing. Every action that reduces 
the impact of international rules or voice opportunities of other actors will qualify here. 
These may range from increasing one's voting weight in international organizations to 
leaving international organizations or regimes altogether or not accepting new obligations. 
Decreasing others' capabilities may seem less straightforward nowadays, but is 
nonetheless a quite effective way of increasing one's own power. War is the most obvious 
attempt to follow this strategy, because it impacts on all relevant resources of one's 
opponent, be they military, economic or geographic, albeit at potentially high costs for 
oneself. A different way to decrease others' capabilities would be to establish cooperation 
that is more beneficial to oneself than to the other side in terms of welfare gains. 
Finally, decreasing others' autonomy largely corresponds to what Baumann, 
Rittberger and Wagner (2001) term "influence-seeking", i.e. the attempt to obtain voice 
opportunities over others' actions. This can be achieved by bringing other states into 
international organizations in which oneself has a say. However, even if other states become 
restricted by international rules in which oneself has no say, this might not increase one's 
influence on these states, but it nonetheless reduces their autonomy and thus increases one's 
own power. 
This brief inventory of ideal-type balancing strategies already demonstrates that 
structural realism suggests many more strategies than only military build-ups and the 
forging of alliances as the bulk of the current research on balancing suggests.6 However, not 
all of the balancing strategies that could be listed here are easy to classify. As a matter of 
fact, only a very limited number of strategies affect only one aspect of a state's power in a 
straightforward manner and are thus easily placed in one of the categories above. Most 
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the first set of strategies stressing particularly the increase in capabilities and only briefly discussing autonomy 
issues. Baumann, Rittberger and Wagner (2001) focus on both sides of the autonomy issue (autonomy-seeking 
and influence-seeking) but largely ignore the capabilities issue. Mearsheimer (1994, 2001) reflects on both 
autonomy and capabilities, yet in different publications. 
6 For overviews over recent approaches to balancing see Vasquez/Elman (2003) and Paul et al. (2004).    8 
strategies will affect different aspects and many of them will do so in a rather ambiguous 
fashion. Consider just one example: a state buying new weapons systems for its armed 
forces. This state will increase its power by increasing its military capabilities. If it buys the 
weapons at home it will, furthermore, cause the production of an additional economic 
surplus and thus increase both its GDP and its power. On the other hand, however, the 
resources that the state invests to cause this economic surplus must be extracted from the 
domestic economy in the first place. To calculate the net effect of the investment, therefore, 
opportunity costs have to be taken into account. If the money had not been used to buy 
weapons—would it have been spent less productively? Or would it have been used to 
produce an even greater economic surplus? If so, could the difference in economic surplus 
even have outweighed the increase in state power that was created through the upgrading 
of the weaponry?  
P l e n t y  o f  r e s e a r c h  h a s  b e e n  d o n e  o n  t h i s  single issue (e.g. Schäfer 1996, see also 
Glaser 1996: 150 ff.) and it aptly illustrates the complications one soon encounters when 
seeking to answer seemingly easy questions like 'does buying weapons really increase a 
state's power?' This research indicates that estimating the net effect of defence spending for 
a state's power would make necessary at least two difficult decisions: (a) determining the 
efficient level of defence spending (how much spending is necessary to redress the 
international imbalance of power?) (b) weighing military versus economic capabilities (does 
the increase in military capabilities outweigh the loss in economic welfare for the state's 
power base?). 
This illustrates for only one of the options the difficulties that choices under 
seemingly clear incentives may produce. Neither real-world actors nor researchers can be 
expected to exactly calculate an optimal solution in such circumstances. And keep in mind 
that we are still considering an ideal-type state that is subject to only a very simple set of 
pressures derived from the structure of the international system.  
Is a model whose representation of the international incentive structure produces 
such confusing and apparently indeterminate results useless? I would argue that it is not, 
because it provides us with a tool to detect the major concerns of rational decision-makers in 
deciding on their preferred policy choice. The implication is that decision-makers will face 
the same difficulties in decision situations as we do when pondering the different options. 
The empirical investigation will help us to learn how they dealt with these difficulties. 
Furthermore it would be wrong to think that the framework is completely indeterminate 
just because it does not come up with an easy decision rule that helps us to predict a single 
determinate policy outcome for any given situation. Rather, it demonstrates that the   9 
incentives stemming from the anarchic structure of the international system narrow down 
the range of rational alternatives for action, although they do not force a single option on the 
state. A rational state will not simply shrug off changes in the international distribution of 
power. It will prefer, in such a situation, strategies that have an unequivocal positive impact 
on its control over resources; it will discard options that have an unambiguous negative 
impact on its power; and, if it has to consider a trade-off between several aspects of its 
power, it will weigh different options, not be willing to accept losses without substantial 
gains, and ultimately come up with a solution that may be contested internally and whose 
exact shape will be difficult, if not impossible, to determine in advance. 
Summary 
Thus far, I have relied on neorealism to identify the basic constraints and incentives states 
face in the international system. These are key incentives for security policy because they 
directly concern the security and survival of the state. Neorealism suggests that the major 
constraints and incentives in the international political realm stem from the anarchic 
structure of the system and the variable distribution of capabilities among states. In periods 
of a stable balance of power there are strong incentives to stick to the status quo. If, 
however, the balance is disturbed, there will be strong incentives for states to respond. 
States whose power is negatively affected face strong incentives to regain power both by 
increasing their capabilities and their autonomy in using them and by decreasing others' 
capabilities and autonomy. This entails an important insight for the analysis of British and 
German ESDP policies. The end of the Cold War will have created strong incentives for both 
states to engage in balancing; i.e. to seek autonomy and additional capabilities. 
 
Modifying the neorealist argument: history matters 
Overall the neorealist argument suggests that change in the international distribution of 
power will lead states to adapt their foreign and security policies accordingly. It is, however, 
far from self-evident that actors will adjust smoothly to these changes. Social actors often do 
not react immediately to variation in their wider context. Rather, there are strong forces for 
continuity even in the face of altered circumstances. I will argue that this is not due to some 
inexplicable inertia inherent in the actors, which causes them to react to a changing 
environment only with some unspecified time lag. Rather there are systematic incentives for 
these actors to stick to an established policy path. These incentives stem from institutions, in   10 
which their policies have become embedded over time. In effect, past policies continue to 
influence present-day decisions through their institutionalization.  
Overall then history will matter. If past policies are stabilized through institutions 
they will not easily be discarded, even if changes in the international distribution of power 
would seem to require this. In what follows I will explore how institutions may become a 
source of continuity in the face of change. I will utilize arguments from new institutional 
economics and from historical institutionalism in comparative sociology and comparative 
politics and translate them to the international realm and foreign policy analysis.  
Institutions and international relations 
Following the bulk of new institutionalist research I define institutions as immaterial, shared 
standards of behavior and interaction (e.g. North 1990: 3 f.). Why and how do institutions 
affect actors' behavior? From a rationalist perspective, institutions constitute a peculiar set of 
constraints and incentives for actors. They may constrain actors by implying that certain 
actions—not obeying the rules—are likely to be punished. More importantly, however, they 
induce actors to follow certain courses of action because it is beneficial for them to stick to 
the rules. Effective institutions result in coordinated behavior which lowers transaction costs 
and reduces uncertainty—an effect that must be highly valued by rational actors because it 
allows them to make more reliable calculations about the future.  
These institutional constraints and incentives—basically consisting of the imperative 
to follow established rules—may, however, come into conflict with other incentives like 
those stemming from the international distribution of power. Especially in times of change, 
i.e. in situations in which the distribution of power is altered, such conflicts may occur. How 
will states react if changes in the international distribution of power require from them to 
realign their security policies but there are established routines that require from them to 
stick to their established alignments? 
The question whether the incentives from institutions or those from the international 
distribution of power will prevail in such a situation has dominated much of the debate 
between neorealism and institutionalism in International Relations (for an overview, see 
Baldwin 1993). However, it seems to me that the question has been framed in a way that has 
hindered the debate to come up with fruitful results. Throughout it was perceived as an 
either-or question: either states will stick to institutional commitments or they won't. In 
effect neorealist texts tended to claim that institutions will not matter whereas texts based on 
institutionalist theory claimed them to prevail (Keohane 1993: 272; as an example see the 
juxtaposition of both approaches in Hellmann/Wolf 1993). Attempts from both camps to   11 
find some middle ground took the form of formulating scope conditions: Under certain 
conditions states would focus on absolute gains and thus be inclined to form and maintain 
international institutions; under others states would strive for relative gains and thus tend to 
disregard them (Grieco 1988; Keohane 1989: 15, 18; Keohane 1993: 274-283).  
I would argue that the either-or frame of the debate (to which the idea of scope 
conditions stayed faithful as well) unnecessarily restricted the range of options discussed. 
States will not have to calculate whether they should stay true to institutions or simply 
ignore them. Rather there is a third important option: adjusting institutions. Moreover, if 
institutions are correctly claimed to be the fabric of social interaction, one might even argue 
that in persistent social relations discarding institutions without replacement is not even 
possible. In international politics, if you persistently ignore the rules of the game you don't 
drop out of the game. Rather, you start a new one.  
Consistently ignoring institutional rules thus is tantamount to setting up new 
institutions or at least altering existing ones. Framing the issue this way makes it possible to 
tap into insights from historical institutionalism and new institutional economics which 
have played a somewhat marginal role in IR theorizing. In contrast to institutionalism in IR, 
these lines of thought do not so much focus on the question whether institutions will be 
created in the first place and matter at all. Their existence and importance is taken for 
granted. Rather research deals with questions like which institutional framework will 
prevail in a state or in an economy or whether always the most efficient framework will 
emerge. Both new institutional economics and historical institutionalism argue that once 
institutions are in place there are powerful forces that will stabilize them even under 
changing circumstances.  
Which are these forces? The bottom line of all rationalist theorizing in this vein is that 
institutions tend to remain stable because it is both unattractive and difficult for actors to 
modify them. Two arguments about why this is so stand out in particular. First, it has been 
argued that institutions are subject to "increasing returns", i.e. once established they become 
self-reinforcing because their continued existence is more beneficial than setting up new 
institutions even if the existing institutions may appear to produce inefficient results. 
Secondly, political institutions in particular are often designed intentionally to make their 
modification especially difficult, which adds to their long-term stability. Taken together, 
these arguments suggest that political institutions entail strong incentives for actors to stick 
to established policy paths although long-term change is not completely ruled out.   12 
Increasing returns: institutions as self-reinforcing mechanisms 
Douglass C. North has established the argument that institutions are subject to positive 
feedback effects and thus self-reinforcing mechanisms. He relied on general accounts of such 
mechanisms in economics as introduced by authors like W. Brian Arthur. Arthur argued 
that in a market there may exist situations of "increasing returns" in which market 
mechanisms are fundamentally altered. In such situations the market will not necessarily 
produce efficient solutions, as expected by neoclassical economics. Rather, single products 
may gain a dominant position because consumers will be inclined to stick to them even if 
they may be inferior to other products in the long run.  
Many processes of technological innovation and standardization are subject to such 
self-reinforcing mechanisms. The classical example is the QWERTY keyboard.7 When the 
typewriter was invented a decision had to be made as to the ordering of the keys on the 
keyboard. The keyboard had to be designed in a way that prevented malfunctions. In 
particular, it had to be avoided that two keys next to each other were pressed too quickly 
after each other causing the typebars to get stuck. There were multiple "best" solutions to 
achieve this, one of them the QWERTY ordering. More or less randomly this one evolved 
into the standard for British and US typewriters (with other standards for other regions of 
the world). Later on this keyboard design was transferred to computer keyboards although 
now there was no danger of neighboring keys getting stuck when pressed too quickly. In 
this sense the ordering of the keys on computer keyboards is path dependent. It depends on 
a decision made much earlier. This decision at a critical juncture, moreover, had a random 
component and the resulting path-dependent decision is inefficient since it unnecessarily 
decreases typing speed on computers. Economists have widely discussed QWERTY and 
several other instances of technical standards which emerged along these lines. They range 
from the VHS standard for videocassette recorders over the direction in which a clock's 
hands move around the dial (for both examples see Arthur 1994b) to the battle between AC 
and DC electricity standards (David/Bunn 1988). 
However, not all technologies set off such self-reinforcing processes once they are 
introduced. W. Brian Arthur has investigated which characteristics of a technological 
                                                       
7 See David (1985) for the classic account why the QWERTY ordering evolved into a standard for typewriters in 
the late 19th century although there were competing and technically superior solutions available already at that 
time. Since I use the argument for illustrative purposes only I transfer it here to the computer age in order to 
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innovation make it prone to positive feedback effects. He compiled a list of four "generic 
sources" from which the mechanisms described above usually derive (Arthur 1988: 10).8 
(1)  Large setup costs: If setup costs for a given technology are large, it 
obviously pays to stick to an option once that road has been taken. If a 
quick switch was made, the large investment would have been in vain and 
the new option chosen is likely to require a large investment as well. 
(2)  Learning effects: If a technology is complex, learning how to operate it 
will be a major investment as well. Once one has become knowledgeable it 
pays to stick to that technology instead of switching to a new one and 
having to do the learning all over again. 
(3)  Coordination effects: "These occur when the benefits an individual 
receives from a particular activity increase as others adopt the same 
option." (Pierson 2004: 24) The more people, for instance, use a certain 
computer operating system the better for every single user because this 
will result in a more varied supply of computer software based on that 
system etc. 
(4)  Adaptive expectations: If people know about the effects above they will 
try to avoid backing the wrong horse. If they ended up having adopted 
the "wrong" technology, i.e. the one not chosen by the majority of users, 
they will be excluded from beneficial learning and coordination effects 
while at the same time switching to the "winner" technology will be quite 
expensive. Therefore individuals will try to calculate who is going to win 
the race and support the prospective winner. These expectations to which 
individuals adapt their decisions therefore reinforce the above effects. 
It is easy to see how under these conditions users will stick to a technology for which they 
have invested a large amount of money, time in learning how to use it, and which has 
additional benefits connected with its dominant position in the market. 
Douglass North (1990) has shown that institutions display all the characteristics of 
those technologies that produce path dependence and concluded that institutional 
development will be marked by path dependence too. 
First, institutions have large initial setup costs. Setting up an institution obviously 
involves investing time and material resources in communication and other activities for 
creating, formulating and sometimes formalizing rules. Once the institution has been 
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created these costs can be considered "sunk" and will not enter in actors' calculations of costs 
and benefits anymore. In IR theory, Robert Keohane has argued that this is a prime reason 
why international institutions are more difficult to create than to maintain (Keohane 1984: 
100 ff.).  
Setup costs are not constant across all institutions (nor are they across all 
technologies). Rather, different institutions come with different setup costs. As a 
consequence, the resilience to change that is implied by these costs will vary from institution 
to institution. Arguably, formalized institutions are likely to carry higher setup costs than 
less formalized ones. The communicative effort in nailing down the rules will be much 
higher and there are various additional costs associated with the process of formalizing 
rules that are absent in the case of informal rules. Nonetheless, setting up an institution will 
never be an easy or cheap task. 
The coordination effects of political institutions are much more difficult to establish 
across the board. From North's standpoint it makes perfect sense to argue that institutions in 
general produce coordination effects because he focuses exclusively on the institutions of 
domestic economies. These indeed produce strong coordination effects. The more actors 
subscribe to a certain set of economic rules the more contracts can be made under these rules 
which obviously is beneficial for all participants. The argument is not so easy to translate to 
the political realm in general and to international relations and foreign and security policy in 
particular. Here there exist certainly institutions for which coordination effects are more 
pronounced than for others. There is one type of situation, in which institutions will 
produce strong coordination effects, namely situations which game theorists have aptly 
labeled "coordination games" (Snidal 1985) or "dilemmas of common aversions" (Stein 1982). 
In these situations actors want to coordinate their behavior and the institution helps them to 
select one of several possible behavioral options. Problems of standardization are typical 
instances of coordination games. Here actors have a common interest in selecting a common 
standard because this will facilitate transactions between them. Institutional rules serve to 
commit them to one among several possible standards (driving on the right or the left lane; 
using the metric or the Imperial system). Institutionalist research has demonstrated that, 
once a solution to a coordination problem has been selected, this solution becomes self-
reinforcing because it is in all actors' interest to stick to the selected option (to drive on the 
right side of the road, for instance) (Stein 1982: 314; Hasenclever et al. 1997: 48).9 The more 
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actors adopt the standard, the more profitable investment in this standard becomes for 
everyone—the institution produces coordination effects which stabilize it. 
But institutions that regulate other types of situations will not necessarily produce 
comparable coordination effects. In "dilemmas of common interests" (Stein 1982) actors need 
to mutually adjust their behavior in order to jointly supply a common good. Actors need to 
collaborate and not just coordinate their policies. Here institutions will not necessarily 
produce coordination effects which result in positive feedback. This is evident, for instance, 
in Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) situations. Institutions which regulate such situations do not 
stabilize themselves when more and more actors adopt the rules. One might even argue that 
the more actors adopt the rules, the greater the incentives for free-riding become.10 In any 
case, there are no significant coordination effects which would contribute to the stability of 
such an institution.  
Taken together, coordination effects will occur in certain political institutions. But 
their significance varies and has to be established for each institution individually. 
Especially institutions in coordination games will produce such effects and thus generate 
positive feedbacks which will stabilize them.  
The remaining two characteristics have much more straightforward implications. 
Both are intimately connected to the raison d'être of institutions. From a rational-choice 
perspective, actors create institutions to acquire more reliable expectations about others' 
actions and to be able to base their own decisions on these expectations. This implies that 
learning effects will be of particular importance in the context of institutions. The more 
adjusted actors become to a particular institutional environment, the more easily they will 
be able to judge how others will act and also to find ways for taking full advantage of these 
rules for themselves. Both implications will be beneficial for them and thus contribute to 
their sticking to these institutions. Since learning is a process in time, learning effects will 
become more pronounced the longer an institution has been in place.  
Finally, the effect of adaptive expectations is also directly linked to the goal with which 
actors had created an institution in the first place. If actors form institutions to stabilize 
expectations because they regard stable expectations as beneficial for themselves, they will 
appreciate the existence of a reliable institution and have strong incentives to continue 
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institutions (see Zangl 1999: 68-76). In order to cooperate in a PD situation actors need to establish mechanisms 
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necessary but also costly. Providing for monitoring and sanctioning involves a (secondary) PD game itself, since 
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basing their own decisions on that institution. Signals by other actors that they intend to 
stick to an institution will contribute to this stabilizing effect of adaptive expectations. Also, 
the more reliable an institution has proven in the past, the more pronounced the stabilizing 
effect of adaptive expectations will become.  
Taken together, then, the effects of institutions are by and large comparable to those 
of certain technologies which result in path dependence. There are some variations among 
institutions in this respect (as there are among technologies). Setup costs of institutions will 
vary and there will be institutions which entail stronger and some with weaker coordination 
effects. Adaptive expectations will become stronger when actors signal their intention to 
stick to an institution. Finally, both learning effects and the effect of adaptive expectations 
will be strongest for institutions which have been in place for some time. Aside from 
individual variations, all these effects provide that institutions in general, and especially 
institutions interlinked in an "institutional matrix", produce "massive increasing returns" 
(North 1990: 95). In other words: once a set of institutions has been established, it pays to 
stick to them—even in situations in which it would be rational to set up a different set of 
institutions had there not already existed one. Hence institutions produce path dependence, 
albeit to different degrees. 
Vested interests and lock-in by design: the peculiar character of political institutions  
Increasing returns are not the only cause why political institutions tend to prove resilient 
when their context changes. Increasing returns explain why institutional change may be 
unattractive for cost-calculating actors. However, actors may find institutional change not 
only unattractive, it may also prove difficult. Even if context changes so dramatically that 
change may become attractive and actors may be willing to invest the resources for setting 
up new institutions or adjusting existent ones, additional difficulties may arise. These are 
due to the peculiar character of political institutions, as it has been highlighted especially by 
historical institutionalist research: political institutions are firmly linked to political conflict. 
This has two important implications when considering the prospects for institutional 
change.  
First, actors privileged by an institution may resist pressures for change. The 
predominant functionalist perspective on institutions in rationalist IR theory sometimes 
tends to obscure that institutions may distribute resources unevenly among actors and 
privilege some actors over others.11 Some actors may have a stake in an existing institution 
even if for other actors the institution appears increasingly dysfunctional. These privileged 
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actors may therefore set out to rescue the institution and actively counteract pressures for 
change (Moe 2005: 227) either by openly defending the institution or, if they are powerful 
enough, by suppressing challenges to the institution altogether (Bachrach/Baratz 1962). 
While such actors may stand in the way of institutional change for both formal and informal 
institutions, their influence will be greatest when formal institutions are concerned. Formal 
institutions may give them instruments for actively preventing a reformulation of existing 
rules even when they are a minority.  
This points to a second obstacle for change in formal political institutions. These 
institutions may be intentionally designed to resist change. Such institutional obstacles to 
change are a quite common feature of formal political institutions. Often their modification 
requires super-majorities or even unanimity among actors. Some constitutions even prohibit 
their own modification. This "status quo bias of political institutions" (Pierson 2004: 42) is 
not a somewhat curious peculiarity of political institutions but often the result of rational 
design. If formal institutions are the outcome of political conflict, there will be substantial 
incentives to design institutions in a way that makes them resistant to change. First, 
powerful actors can utilize institutional rules to influence outcomes in their interest in the 
long run. If they manage to establish favorable rules they will take care to ensure the 
permanence of those rules by raising the obstacles for future rule changes.12 Governments 
may, for instance, use international institutions to tie the hands of potential domestic rivals 
or successors. Thus governments of newly established democracies, for instance, have tied 
their states to international human rights regimes in order to prevent subsequent 
governments from returning to authoritarian rule and thus to lock-in democratic institutions 
at home (Moravcsik 2000). In a similar vein, it has also been argued that institutions for 
nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil were created in the early 1990s in order 
to make it more difficult for subsequent governments and the military to reverse policy 
changes (Sotomayor Velazquez 2004: 50-52). In such instances it is rational for state 
governments to build strong obstacles for change into the institutions and thus make future 
institutional changes exceedingly difficult.  
Leaders may, secondly, design resilient institutions not only in order to tie the hands 
of their successors; but also to tie their own hands. Thus they can make their commitments 
credible which makes it easier for them to win partners and broker solutions in their 
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interest.13 IR theory has focused especially on how domestic institutions may contribute to 
this mechanism. Certain domestic institutions of liberal democracies, e.g. public 
accountability, the longwinded character of democratic policy-making or the rule of law, 
make it highly unlikely that leaders will suddenly reverse their international promises and 
pursue institutional change at the international level. Therefore these domestic institutions 
contribute to international institutional stability and make international commitments by 
democratic states more credible than commitments by other states (Cowhey 1993, Gaubatz 
1996, Leeds 1999).  
Taken together, if we acknowledge that political institutions are embedded in 
political conflict, we discover additional causes for institutional resilience. Especially formal 
political institutions are likely to have resilience built in by design. Creators of such 
institutions may want to bind their successors to certain institutional patterns, or they may 
wish to demonstrate their own credibility by tying their own hands through establishing 
persistent political institutions. 
Summary: history matters through institutions 
Overall, we have seen that actors face strong incentives to stick to a policy once this policy 
has become embedded in political institutions. Durable policy changes would imply that 
existing institutions were modified or new institutions were set up. This, in turn, will be 
unattractive for actors and, especially in the case of formal political institutions, may also 
prove difficult. It is unattractive due to the sunk costs in institutions or the increasing 
r e t u r n s  t h e y  p r o d u c e  o n c e  t h e y  h a v e  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d .  T h i s  e f f e c t  w i l l  b e  e s p e c i a l l y  
pronounced for institutions with large set-up costs and significant coordination effects and 
for institutions to which actors have over long time adapted due to learning effects and the 
effects of adaptive expectations. It may be difficult because especially formal political 
institutions are often set up in a way that poses high formal obstacles to institutional change.  
Hence institutions are barriers for policy change. These barriers will make change 
difficult, yet not impossible. Moreover, the resilience of institutions will vary. Table 1 
summarizes the different dimensions of institutional resilience and outlines an 
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approximation at which kind of institution will prove most resilient in which dimension. 
This should not be read as a firm and definite typology but as an illustration, which may 
guide (yet not replace) the examination of individual institutions in specific cases. 
Combining the mechanisms discussed above, we arrive at a spectrum of institutions in 
terms of their resilience against change. On the one extreme, there are formal political 
institutions with strong coordination effects and formally institutionalized obstacles to rule 
change. They will be most resistant to change, especially if they have been established for a 
long time. At the other extreme, there are young informal, institutions with weak 
coordination effects, which will be most susceptible to change. 
 
  strong resilience  weak resilience 
formalized obstacles for change 
(existent/non-existent) 
set-up costs  
(high/low) 
formal institutions  informal institutions 
coordination effects 
(strong/weak) 
coordination game  no coordination game 
learning effects 
(strong/weak) 
adaptive expectations 
(strong/weak) 
old institutions  young institutions 
Table 1: Variation in institutional resilience 
 
ESDP policies: the incentive structure 
The general incentive structure for security policies 
I have so far developed two basic aspects of the incentive structure that states face in the 
security realm independently from each other: the implications of the distribution of power 
and consequences of the institutional setting. To explain a state's security policy we must 
understand how these two aspects combine and how states will react to changes in this 
combined incentive structure.  
The most straightforward situations (for decision-makers and researchers alike) will 
be those in which both sets of constraints and incentives reinforce each other. These will be 
situations in which the distribution of power induces states to follow policies which are in 
line with their institutional environment. In these instances the range of policy options 
which are attractive and unattractive for the states concerned will be fairly uncontroversial. 
Yet states may also come under conflicting pressures. These are particularly likely when the   20 
distribution of power shifts in a direction that contradicts the current institutional setting. In 
such a situation a state faces strong pressures to adjust its security policy and to bring it in 
line with the new distribution of power. But at the same time there are high costs associated 
with leaving the established policy path. These costs may vary, depending on the 
particularities of the institutional setting and they will crucially affect whether a state will 
follow the incentives for balancing and how it will do so. In short: in responding to shifts in 
the international distribution of power states will be sensitive to institutional costs. An 
analysis of balancing, therefore, must look not only at power shifts but also at how 
balancing incentives may be constrained by a state's institutional environment and how 
states attempt to modify this environment in order to satisfy the pressures for balancing. 
That institutions are forces for continuity and constrain how actors react to changes 
in their environment does not make them immutable barriers for change. They will come 
under pressure when they are no longer in line with other incentive structures. In response 
to shifts in other incentive structures they may well be modified or new institutions may be 
created by interested actors. However, this institutional change will be difficult and costly. 
Change will be incremental and start at the margins of the institutional setting, i.e. in those 
institutions for which adaptive costs are lowest.  
How does all this add up from the point of view of a state deciding over the course 
of its security policy? The existence of institutions significantly complicates the translation of 
incentives into action. We have already seen above that even under very parsimonious 
assumptions about the incentives facing states it is difficult to derive a determinate ordering 
of preferences over policies. Now that we have added the significance of history through the 
existence of institutions this situation becomes even more complex. Actors will not only 
have to judge the costs and benefits an option implies for their capabilities and autonomy 
relative to other actors. Furthermore they need to take into account the costs that would 
result from deviating from existing institutions and setting up new ones.  
Although it may appear extremely difficult to calculate a single best policy option or 
a complete ordering of preferences under these conditions, this view of the incentive 
structure nonetheless enables us to formulate some expectations about which kind of 
options states are likely to choose and which options they are likely to discard. 
Their most preferred choice will be options that can satisfy both pressures, i.e. 
options that will lead to an increase in power without harming existing institutions and 
without the need to set up new ones. This will, at best, be a very narrow range of options, 
however, because power is enhanced by increasing autonomy, whereas institutions tend to 
curtail actors' autonomy. If institutional costs cannot be avoided, states will prefer those   21 
options for which these costs are lowest. We have seen above that several factors impact on 
the costs and difficulties for institutional change: setup costs, the significance of 
coordination and learning effects and of adaptive expectations as well as formal obstacles 
for rule change. The lower the costs and difficulties associated with institutional change and 
creation the more willing states will be to modify an existing institution or create a new one.  
There are several implications of this view that separate the framework introduced 
here from both neorealist and institutionalist perspectives of international relations. In 
contrast to neorealism it implies that, once institutions exist (and it is not the existence of 
institutions which is denied by neorealism but their significance for international politics) 
rational actors in an anarchic environment cannot be expected to rapidly adjust their 
behavior to changes in the international distribution of power. There may even be extreme 
situations where actors are embedded in a highly institutionalized environment in which 
even marginal institutions come with large setup costs, important coordination and learning 
effects, in which adaptive expectations are important and formal obstacles for institutional 
change high. In such situations the effects of path dependence may be so strong that 
imbalances may persist.14 Balances thus will not necessarily recur. G. John Ikenberry (1998), 
for instance, has argued that the liberal hegemonic order institutionalized after World War II 
by the United States has been so much stabilized by the effects of path dependence that it 
will remain unaltered after the end of the Cold War. 
 In contrast to rational choice institutionalism in IR theory, however, the persistence 
of institutions cannot be taken for granted. First, there are institutions which are more 
susceptible to change or dissolution than others. Second, once institutions in the margins 
have been changed, there may occur a recursive dynamic for the policies of individual 
states. Changes in marginal institutions (i.e. in those least resistant to change) may affect the 
overall incentive structure and thus further increase incentives for increasing autonomy and 
capabilities. These may, over time, become so strong that they outweigh even the costs of 
changing or discarding initially more resilient institutions. Thus balancing may ultimately 
prevail even when strong institutions stand in its way at first; albeit on a more complicated 
path than envisaged by straightforward neorealist accounts. 
Overall, the framework suggests that if balancing occurs it will take a peculiar form. 
It will start at the margins, i.e. where resistance is least pronounced and may then continue 
from there depending on the features of the institutional setting. 
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The incentive structure for ESDP policies 
It is now easy to transfer this abstract theoretical argument to the ESDP policies of EU 
member states. According to the analytical framework the end of bipolarity in 1989/90 
significantly altered the incentive structure for EU member states. They faced strong 
incentives to engage in balancing due to the emergence of a unipolar distribution of power. 
However, their security policies were embedded in different sets of institutions. These 
institutions may partly contradict the balancing incentives (e.g. institutions that link a state 
to the US) or reinforce them (e.g. institutions that support an autonomous power-seeking 
security policy). Moreover institutions contradicting the balancing incentives may come 
with different degrees of resilience. Overall the analytical framework suggests that different 
EU member states will have to respond to different sets of international constraints and 
incentives. Those states, like Britain, whose security policy had become embedded in strong 
transatlantic institutions, will have the weakest incentives to engage in balancing. Their 
institutional environment will come under pressure however and may be altered over time. 
Such changes will start at marginal institutions. Yet marginal changes may set off a recursive 
dynamic that, step by step, makes even a modification of stronger institutions possible over 
time. On the other hand states whose security institutions support an autonomy-seeking 
security policy, like France, will have the strongest incentives to pursue balancing strategies. 
Evidence: British and German ESDP policies as constrained balancing 
To fully appreciate the utility of this analytical framework it is necessary to carry out 
detailed case studies of German and British policies towards ESDP. These case studies 
would, first, have to examine the incentive structure for each state at the end of the Cold 
War. This requires a look at the changes in the international distribution of power and 
especially at the institutional environment for each state and the resilience of each 
institution. Second, the studies would have to trace how this incentive structure affected the 
policies pursued by the UK and Germany. Overall such case studies could establish whether 
Britain and Germany actually engaged in constrained balancing. 
Such a detailed analysis, especially of institutional resilience, employing the criteria 
developed above is well beyond the scope of this paper. The primary goal of this paper has 
been theoretical, i.e. to develop a frame for analyzing ESDP policies grounded in structural 
theories of IR and Comparative Politics. In what follows I will not engage in detailed 
empirical analysis but take out some aspects of British and German policies towards ESDP 
and briefly suggest ways in which the analytical framework developed above could help us 
understand these policies. My task in this section, therefore, is to discuss how different   23 
aspects of British and German policies could be understood as responses to the rise of the 
US to lone great power status—responses that took into account the specific institutional 
constraints each country faced. I will discuss this with respect to four issues.  
(1)  The general approach which the UK and Germany have taken towards the 
creation of autonomous EU military capabilities. Here the framework can 
help us understand why both states' approaches first diverged so sharply. 
Although they faced similar incentives to engage in balancing Britain was 
subject to much stronger institutional constraints than Germany. 
(2)  The particular development of British ESDP policy. Here the framework 
contrasts sharply with usual explanations. These tend to conceive of the 
1998 change in British policy as a sudden U turn attributable to 
characteristics of Tony Blair and his Labour government. Instead the 
framework directs our attention to underlying institutional changes 
between 1990 and 1998 which relaxed the constraints on UK power-
seeking and thus paved the way for a change in British policy. 
(3)  The policy discourse in the UK and Germany. If the international 
incentive structure affects foreign policies it must somehow become 
reflected in the foreign policy decision-making process. Thus the 
framework would suggest that conflict in foreign policy decision-making 
may actually reflect the presence of conflicting international incentives; 
and the absence of conflict in decision-making may reflect the presence of 
a straightforward set of international constraints and incentives. 
(4)  British and German policies towards the design of ESDP. The framework 
will help to understand not only whether Germany and Britain advocate 
the creation of EU military capabilities; but also how these should be 
designed from their points of view. The framework sheds light on 
similarities in underlying goals of both states (e.g. the goal to create 
autonomous operational planning capabilities) which are otherwise easily 
overlooked. 
General approach towards ESDP: initial divergence 
First, the analytical framework offers an explanation for the general attitude of the British 
and the German government towards the idea of an independent EU military capability. 
Both states started with highly divergent positions—Britain opposing any military capability 
for the European Union, Germany supporting the idea of a common European defence   24 
policy—but after almost ten years they ended up both supporting ESDP. The framework 
offers a straightforward explanation for this pattern. British and German positions 
ultimately converged because they were both subject to the same incentives resulting from 
the international distribution of power. For both states the end of the Cold War implied a 
loss of power relative to the US. After the break-down of the Soviet Union US power was no 
longer kept in check and the US no longer depended on its Western European allies in a 
global stand-off. The shift in the international distribution of power therefore strongly 
disadvantaged Western European states (amongst others) and resulted in strong incentives 
for them to increase their capabilities and their autonomy vis-à-vis the US.  
ESDP is an almost ideal way to respond to these pressures. It does not only allow 
participating states to enhance their capabilities and autonomy relative to the US. It is also 
much less costly than unilateral attempts to gain power. To be sure ESDP does not result in 
completely autonomous capabilities for participating states. But in comparison to crisis 
management capabilities as realized in NATO or in the WEU, ESDP provides a significant 
increase in autonomy. This holds especially for bigger states like the UK and Germany, 
which—through ESDP—no longer depend on the collaboration of a single far superior state 
but can cooperate with equivalent or less powerful partners. A greater degree of autonomy 
could only be achieved by becoming self-sufficient in this area and thus at unrealistically 
high costs. 
For Britain, however these strong incentives were countered by opposing incentives 
stemming from the institutional structure in which Britain's security policy had become 
embedded during the Cold War. Britain's security policy had become enmeshed in a "special 
relationship" with the US. This special relationship can be represented as a set of strong 
institutions which stabilized British dependence on the US in the security realm. These links 
were especially strong with respect to nuclear issues and intelligence cooperation.15 In 
contrast to the UK, German links with the US were far less "special". To be sure, Germany is 
linked institutionally to the US. But these links are mostly embedded in multilateral 
institutions and the resulting relation between Germany and the US is, in institutional terms, 
far less close than Anglo-American relations. There is no single area in which US-German 
cooperation would have evolved in a similarly strong set of institutions as those that bind 
the UK to the US in the nuclear and intelligence realm.  
Germany has, however, quite special institutional links in the security realm with 
France (e.g. Laird 1989). During the Cold War an intricate web of Franco-German security 
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institutions has developed, based on the 1963 Elysée Treaty, on both the political and the 
military level. Political institutions include formal Franco-German summits and the Franco-
German Defence and Security Council which both are convened twice a year. At the heart of 
military cooperation is the Franco-German Brigade which was agreed in 1987 and set up in 
1989. Moreover there is a lively exchange of military and administrative personnel on all 
levels. It is certainly no exaggeration to say that there is something like a "special 
relationship" between France and Germany. What distinguishes this relationship from the 
Anglo-American special relationship is that there is no pronounced dependence of one 
partner on the other.  
Looking at the institutional set-up we can easily understand why Germany 
immediately reacted to the end of the Cold War and, starting in 1990, supported the idea of 
introducing a defence dimension into European integration, whereas the UK strictly 
opposed this idea. France can be regarded as a 'catalyst' for the German move. During the 
Cold War France had always taken care to keep its security and defence policy autonomous 
(e.g. Sauder 1995). As a result, France faced considerably less institutional constraints to 
follow balancing incentives after the end of the Cold War than the UK and Germany. Hence 
it immediately adapted its security policy to the new circumstances. Through its 
institutional ties with the FRG, it carried Germany with it. Therefore it was no coincidence 
that the first proposals for adding a security and defence dimension to European integration 
after 1989 were contained in two joint letters to the Presidency of the European Council by 
French president Mitterrand and German Chancellor Kohl in 1990 and 1991.16 The British 
however, with weak institutional links to France and strong links to the US, at first resisted 
the pressures for autonomy- and capabilities-seeking. 
The analytical framework suggests that the ultimate policy change of Britain in 1998 
required a prior change in Britain's institutional environment, which at first had blocked a 
turn towards power-seeking. This is the second important implication of the framework: It 
helps us discover the link between changes within the set of British security institutions and 
ultimate changes in the British approach towards ESDP. 
The development of British ESDP policy: changing institutions, changing policy 
An interpretation of British policy based on the framework thus strongly contradicts 
commonsense explanations of British policy. Usually the policy change announced in 
Pörtschach and codified in St. Malo is perceived as a sudden shift, attributable to Tony 
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Blair's aim of proving his government's European credentials while at the same time staying 
out of EMU (e.g. Jonson 2006: 165 f.; Oakes 2000: 10). I would hold that underlying this shift 
were longer-term developments in the institutional setting that paved the way for the 
adjustment of British policy to balancing incentives. Changes were twofold: Anglo-
American institutions came under pressure after the end of the Cold War, especially since 
"adaptive expectations" started to erode. At the same time Britain actively (and in response 
to the global power shift) strengthened institutions that linked the UK to its European 
partners, especially to France. Taken together this resulted in a strengthening of incentives 
favoring European autonomy to which the UK government eventually adapted through its 
policy shift on ESDP in 1998. 
The pressure on Anglo-American institutions resulted in particular from missing US 
signals that the US, after it had been given greater leverage through the changes of 1989/90, 
intended to stick to established patterns of interaction. US ambivalence over existing 
institutions could be seen both in US political rhetoric and US policies. Regarding the latter, 
the three military operations in the Gulf (1991), Bosnia (1995) and in Kosovo/Serbia (1999) 
made it clear that the US did not really accord the UK a very special role in military 
cooperation. Only a few indicators can be listed here. Before the Gulf War, the UK was 
largely excluded from planning. Prime Minister John Major was informed only at 12 hours' 
notice about the imminent begin of the air campaign (Thomas 2000: 34 f.). During the War—
and despite more than 50 years of intense and institutionalized intelligence cooperation 
between the UK and the US—the US hardly shared its satellite images with the UK and 
British troops had to work with outdated maps (Heuser 2005: 151). During the Bosnian War 
doctrinal differences between the UK and the US began to emerge more clearly (Thomas 
2000: 38-45). Moreover transatlantic tensions mounted especially over the arms embargo 
against Bosnian Muslims and the UK found itself on t he Eu ropean sid e in th is dispu te.  
Europeans viewed US insistence on lifting the embargo while they (and not the US) had 
troops on the ground as a warning sign. From their viewpoint the conflict indicated that the 
US was increasingly willing to pursue its own policy agenda at the expense of its European 
allies (ibid.; Daalder 2000: 15-18, 31 f.).  
Thus the Kosovo experience, which is often cited as the central reason for Tony 
Blair's policy shift, was only the final point of a longer chain of US actions which made it 
clear that existing institutions could no longer be safely expected to bind the US for mutual 
benefit. During the Kosovo War, the US dominated planning and targeting to an extent that 
was resented strongly by the Europeans. In contrast to prior operations, the UK now 
actively engaged in countering this US dominance, e.g. by allowing "US B-52 bombers based   27 
at Fairford in England to be used only against airfields and other isolated military targets, so 
as to avoid collateral damage" (Thomas 2000: 48).  
This problem was further aggravated by political statements from the US 
administration which explicitly indicated that the US was willing to alter established 
institutions. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, for instance, stated after the Kosovo 
war that many in the US were of the opinion that a similar US effort in a European crisis 
would be "neither politically nor militarily sustainable" in the future.17 In effect such 
statements, which had already been made after the war in Bosnia, sent out the signal that the 
security relation between the US and its European allies had to be remodeled. Assessed 
from an institutionalist perspective, all these signals coming from US behavior and rhetoric 
weakened expectations that existing institutional links would remain intact; and reinforced 
the incentives for the Europeans, including the UK, to seek autonomy from the US. 
However it was not only the pressure on Anglo-American institutions that affected 
the British institutional environment. The UK also began to cooperate more closely with its 
European partners in security affairs, especially by reviving the WEU and forging closer 
links with France. These institutional adjustments were narrowly circumscribed at first. Yet 
over time and in combination with eroding US-UK institutions they ultimately opened the 
door for a more active role of the UK in EU defence policy. 
The British had already in the late 1980s started to carefully intensify cooperation 
with their European partners on security cooperation. This can be read as a response to the 
approaching end of the Cold War and had been done at first in a way which did not harm 
existing Anglo-American institutions, as the analytical framework leads us to expect. The 
UK actively participated in awakening the WEU from its hibernation in the late 1980s. It 
agreed to reviving the institution in 1984, continued to support a more prominent role for 
the WEU as long as it was not perceived as an alternative to NATO (Duke 1994: 122) and 
participated in the first active WEU military operation—a minesweeping operation in the 
Persian Gulf in 1988 during the Iran-Iraq War (Duke 1996: 171). It is interesting to note that, 
fully in line with the international incentive structure identified by the analytical framework, 
British policy at that time can be understood as a reaction to events that indicated, first, an 
increasing relaxation of the bipolar standoff (and thus increasing incentives for Europeans to 
engage in power-seeking themselves); and, secondly, a growing willingness of the US to 
ignore the immediate security interests of their European allies (and thus a relaxation of 
institutional constraints on European balancing attempts). These moderate changes in both 
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the bipolar confrontation and Anglo-American security institutions had become obvious, for 
instance, in the 1986 Reykjavik meeting of Gorbachev and Reagan, in which the US had 
agreed to cut strategic arms without first consulting their European allies. Such events 
modified the incentive structure yet, of course, without completely transforming it. Hence 
the UK government reacted with moderate calls for a stronger European role which aimed 
at leaving Anglo-American security institutions intact. This delicate situation for British 
security policy is neatly captured by the call of then Foreign Secretary Howe after the 
Reykjavik meeting to revive the WEU "'as a forum for defining European defence priorities 
within NATO'" (quoted by Duke 1994: 122).  
What is even more important, after the end of the Cold War the UK began to 
intensify its military cooperation with France. This intensified Anglo-French cooperation is 
in line with the balancing incentives that emerged at the end of the Cold War. Yet it was 
designed in a way which did not challenge Anglo-American institutions head on. Stronger 
operational cooperation was the first issue which was addressed by Britain and France. The 
issue was discussed already in January 1988 (when the bipolar global confrontation had 
been significantly weakened but still appeared unlikely to collapse) at a meeting of French 
President Mitterrand and British Prime Minister Thatcher. They identified their overseas 
interests as potential common ground and decided to look into possibilities for cooperating 
in military operations outside the NATO territory (Hilz 2005: 86). After 1989/90 this form of 
cooperation gained momentum. Both countries cooperated closely on the ground in Bosnia. 
This resulted in a "far closer working relationship between the Foreign Office and the Quai 
d'Orsay"18, which included regular exchanges of civil servants from the foreign ministries.19 
They further institutionalized cooperation by setting up the Franco British Euro Air Group 
in 1995, agreed in 1996 to create a Joint Commission on Peacekeeping, to intensify 
cooperation between their navies in November 1996 and between their armies in November 
1997.20 In July 1996 the list of Franco-British cooperative arrangements in the military realm 
comprised a number of twinning arrangements between military units and a host of 
bilateral training programs. Moreover France and the UK cooperated on a long list of 
defence research and equipment issues.21 The cooperation was also extended to the nuclear 
realm albeit in a way that did not immediately harm Anglo-American nuclear collaboration. 
In 1992 the UK and France set up a Joint Nuclear Commission, which however excluded 
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20 UK Ministry of Defence, 2001: UK-French Bilateral Defence Cooperation, 
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operational issues, i.e. those issues on which Britain cooperated particularly closely with the 
US (like submarine patrolling).22 
Thus both institutional developments—strengthening the WEU and cooperating 
with France—were crafted in a way that did not directly challenge UK cooperation with the 
US. The WEU remained subordinate to NATO and cooperation with France at that time took 
place in a way which did not contradict UK commitments to Anglo-American cooperation. 
S o  w e  s e e  t h a t  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  c a n  b e  r e a d  a s  b a l a n c i n g  d i d  i n  f a c t  o c c u r  y e t  t h e y  w e r e  
circumscribed by the UK's institutional context. These marginal changes in the institutions, 
however, paved the way for increasingly close cooperation among European partners. 
Moreover the slow erosion of the resilience of Anglo-American institutions gradually 
removed the barriers for this intra-European cooperation. Eventually the British-French 
rapprochement and the intensified cooperation within the WEU and the EU together with 
the relaxation of US-UK linkages paved the way for a more proactive British role in 
European security policy.  
Such an analysis of UK policy would of course suggest that pressures for 
Europeanization would have mounted not only on the Blair government but on a 
Conservative government as well. There are indeed indications that appear to support such 
an argument. First of all, the rapprochement with France and the activation of the WEU in 
the late 1980s and 1990s were indeed policies pursued by a Conservative government. 
Secondly, participants in the policy process who witnessed the Major government's stance in 
the Amsterdam IGC hold that even a Conservative government would ultimately have 
come out in favor of ESDP. This may have taken a little longer, but would ultimately have 
been highly likely anyways. After all, already in the Major government "there was an 
increasing recognition that the UK had to prove its European credentials" in the area of 
defence.23 
The domestic political process: conflict and harmony 
The link between international incentive structures, on the one hand, and foreign policy 
actions, on the other hand, must somehow run through the process of foreign policy 
decision-making. Conflicting incentives should therefore become visible as conflict in the 
policy process, whereas decision-making will proceed more smoothly in an environment 
where there is a straightforward set of coherent incentives. Therefore the analytical 
framework helps us understand the policy process in the UK and Germany in a novel way. 
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Viewed thus political conflict is rooted in the general international situation of a state. 
D i f f e r e n t  i n c e n t i v e s  w i l l  f i n d  d i f f e r e n t  d o m e s t i c  a d v o c a t e s .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  a l l  
domestic conflict results from the international structures in which a state is embedded. 
However attention to these structures can add to our understanding of domestic conflict by 
opening the horizon of the analysis beyond immediate domestic circumstances.  
The analytical framework thus suggests that the political processes in Germany and 
in the UK differed significantly because the two countries faced fundamentally different 
international situations. Whereas the international incentive structure was fairly 
straightforward for Germany, the UK faced a problematic situation in which two different 
incentive structures created fundamentally opposing demands on the state. In Britain, the 
contentious character of European defence resulted in significantly lower public support 
rates for ESDP than in both France and Germany (Wagner 2005: 15, 33). It also became 
visible in fierce public debates. It is important to note that the substantial arguments put 
forward in favor of and in opposition to the Europeanization of defence reflected the 
incentives identified by the analytical framework to a considerable extent. The balancing 
motive can be encountered in many policy statements of the British government. An EU 
military capability is perceived to help the UK and Europeans 'make a difference' on the 
international stage—which in political science terms means: to become more powerful. A 
few illustrations from Pörtschach and its immediate aftermath must suffice here. When 
introducing his new policy towards EU defence at the press conference in Pörtschach, for 
instance, Tony Blair stated: "As Kosovo has brought home to us, it is right that Britain and 
other European countries, as part of Europe, play a key and leading role and that we 
enhance our capability to make a difference in those situations."24 What is implied here is, of 
course, that Europeans should be able to make such a difference without the US, which is 
nothing but a rephrasal of the balancing incentives identified by structural realism. Similar 
points were made in the debate about the issue in the House of Lords on 10 November 
1998.25 Opposition against the Pörtschach move immediately turned to the other side of 
Britain's international incentive structure to support its views. In a House of Commons 
debate a day later, Conservative MP Julian Brazier, for instance, referred to "the crucial role 
that American research and development plays in our programmes"26 and pointed to the 
danger that a stronger defence role for the EU may endanger these Anglo-American links. 
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In Germany, on the other hand, Europeanization of defence created hardly any 
debate and was supported widely by the public. Decision-makers did not feel any serious 
constraints on pursuing the goal of an autonomous military EU capability.27 Public opinion 
supports ESDP at consistently high levels (Wagner 2005: 15, 33). There was little debate 
about ESDP in the media and parliamentary debates throughout proved little contentious. 
Here too the arguments put forward in favor of European defence reflected the international 
incentive structure. Immediately after the Cologne Council, for instance, Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder explained the creation of ESDP by stating that a common European security and 
defence policy would not harm existing security institutions and at the same time "increase 
the European weight in NATO"28. And even more directly Ludger Vollmer, Minister of State 
in the Foreign Office, stated that the institutional strengthening of EU security policy in 
Cologne "reflects that Europeans depend on A m e r i c a n  s u p p o r t  t o  a n  e x t e n t  t h a t  w e  
ourselves do not want anymore."29   
Once again, this is not to say that domestic conflict is solely determined by 
international structures. Such a proposition would be grotesquely out of line with the 
general thrust of the framework, which does not even claim to determinately explain 
policies but only to identify highly important structural constraints and incentives for 
foreign policies. Nonetheless it directs attention to the fact that domestic conflicts can be 
strongly affected by international structures a n d  o n l y  b e  f u l l y  u n d e r s t o o d  w h e n  t h e s e  
structures are taken into account. 
Designing ESDP: autonomy at low cost 
Finally the analytical framework sheds light on how Germany and the UK would like ESDP 
to be designed. The general goal of both states to achieve autonomy and additional 
capabilities at the lowest possible cost has several implications for the ESDP blueprints of 
both states.  
One important point to which the analytical framework draws attention is the fact 
that autonomy is such a highly valued goal that both states will support a certain amount of 
duplication vis-à-vis NATO to enable the EU to act independently from the US. While the 
duplication issue has several interesting aspects, one of them, namely the issue of creating 
an independent Operational Planning Cell for the EU, has certainly become the most 
prominent one. This issue rose to prominence in April 2003 when four member states, 
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France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, at a summit in Tervuren near Brussels made 
several proposals for enhancing EU defence cooperation. One of their proposals was "the 
creation of a nucleus collective capability for planning and conducting operations for the 
European Union"30. The meeting received significant attention in the media because it united 
four of the most outspoken opponents of the 2003 Iraq War (which had ended just two 
weeks earlier). In the public reaction to the meeting the planning cell proposal was singled 
out as a provocation against NATO and the US (see Howorth 2003: 12, with citations) since 
it appeared to call for a duplication of NATO assets only for the sake of European autonomy 
from the US. 
The UK protested this proposal instantly31 and the issue was commonly perceived as 
pitting Germany (with France) and the UK directly against each other because the UK 
would not allow the EU to become truly independent from the US. The analytical 
framework presented here, however, suggests that there was not so much a difference in 
general goals—both states faced strong incentives to create operational autonomy for the EU 
even if this implied some duplication of NATO assets. Rather the difference lay in the 
institutions with which this general goal had to be made compatible. The UK had to more 
strongly attempt to make such operational autonomy compatible with its institutionalized 
links to the US.  
There is indeed empirical evidence to support this view. German behavior is easily 
explained by the analytical framework. Germany would be expected to support an 
independent European HQ because this would increase autonomy from the US and not 
harm any firmly established institutional links. Moreover France was a strong advocate of 
this idea and the close German-French links should further induce Germany to follow this 
lead. And indeed Germany, jointly with France, pressed for the establishment of a European 
planning cell. In January 2003 the Franco-German Defence and Security Council proposed 
the creation of a European Security and Defence Union and a strengthening of EU command 
capabilities.32 The proposals put forward at the Tervuren summit four months later can be 
viewed as an extension of these proposals. 
The UK's vocal resistance to the idea in 2003 would appear surprising from the 
viewpoint of the analytical framework. Looking more closely at the issue, however, it is easy 
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to recognize that much political rhetoric was involved in the 2003 British resistance to the 
idea of an EU Planning Cell. As the framework suggests this resistance was mainly due to a 
perception at that tim e  t h a t  o p e n  s u p p o r t  f o r  a n  E U  P l a n n i n g  C e l l  c o u l d  h a r m  f i r m l y  
established and mutually beneficial Anglo-American collaboration. In 2003 the issue was 
mainly framed as one of Europeans withdrawing support for the idea of US-led operations. 
The Tervuren summit aimed more or less openly at demonstrating opposition to the US-led 
war in Iraq. In this context the British simply could not afford to support the planning cell 
idea since this could have harmed their operational coalition with the US. What enraged the 
UK administration was not so much the idea of an EU capability for leading military 
operations itself, but the timing with which the proposal had been put forward.33 Officially 
the summit and the proposal were criticized as "divisive" and the government argued that it 
was more important to increase "defence spending on deployable capabilities".34 
Suspiciously, however, the idea of a planning cell itself was not explicitly ruled out. In 
contrast to British silence on the general desirability of such a capability, US NATO 
ambassador Nicholas Burns clearly stated that "Europe does not need more headquarters."35  
Removed from the highly problematic context of the Tervuren summit, the UK 
actually did support the idea of an independent European capability to lead military 
operations. This had already been openly addressed in 1999/2000. In the summer of 1999 
Richard Hatfield of the UK MoD had initiated a discussion about the further development of 
EU defence institutions, including planning capabilities. Four states participated in this 
"Hatfield exercise". Its results were further elaborated by the EU Political Committee and the 
resulting "toolbox paper" was presented at the Sintra Defence Ministers meeting in July 
2000. This paper lays out that for EU military operations without recourse to NATO assets 
member states HQ should be multinationalized and utilized as Operational HQ. But it also 
s e e s  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  s u c h  a n  a p p r o a c h  a n d  c o n c l u d e s :  " I n  t h e  l o n g  r u n ,  s o m e  l e s s  a d  h o c  
collective capability for operational planning and command at the strategic level could have 
to be developed within the EU."36 Thus already in 1999 the UK had initiated a review 
process which resulted in the assessment—agreed by the UK—that the EU may need an 
autonomous capability for operational planning and strategic command. It is not surprising, 
then, that the UK government brokered a compromise solution with Germany and France 
                                                       
33 Interview at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, July 2003. 
34 George Wright: EU Military Summit Angers Britain, The Guardian Unlimited, 29 April 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,945871,00.html [03.05.07] 
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shortly after Tervuren which was later adopted by the EU and NATO. According to this 
agreement the EU did set up its own operational planning cell, but it was embedded into the 
NATO HQ at SHAPE. Additionally the operational planning capacity of the EU Military 
Staff (EUMS) was to be improved. Thus by and large EU planning capabilities remained 
closely linked to NATO albeit organizationally independent. The UK suggested a similar 
solution first in a food for thought paper in August 200337, i.e. less than four months after the 
Tervuren summit. At an informal trilateral Franco-German-British summit in Berlin Blair 
accepted the idea that "the EU should be endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct 
operations without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities".38 The eventual solution 
apparently was agreed at another trilateral summit in Berlin on 28 November 2003.39 The 
speed with which this compromise had been brokered indicates that there was no deep 
underlying gap between the two sides on the issue at stake but that rather questions of 
political framing had to be addressed. And as a matter of fact, UK Minister of State for 
Europe, Denis McShane, stressed in his evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee that the British government had always taken the position that European 
planning had to take place and that European planning capabilities "may have to be 
enhanced as European defence takes on more responsibilities".40 The ultimate compromise 
solution, finally, was designed especially to address exactly those British concerns that the 
analytical framework suggests.  
In other areas of ESDP design, in which no peculiar institutional constraints 
differentiate the UK and Germany, we would expect—and actually do observe—that Britain 
and Germany pursue very similar policies. This holds, for instance, for decision-making 
procedures in ESDP. Both countries have strong incentives to retain the unanimity rule in 
the military realm in order to stay in control of their capabilities. There are no institutional 
restrictions that would differentiate between the two countries. Indeed actual policies of 
both countries concur with this incentive structure: Both countries want to retain the 
unanimity rule in the military area. A brief look at their positions concerning the EU 
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Constitution will suffice to illustrate this. The Joint Franco-German proposal for the 
European Convention suggested that—for launching and carrying out military operations—
"unanimity should remain necessary" and only "the possibility of constructive abstention" 
was mentioned.41 Somewhat more bluntly the British government stated in its White Paper 
for the IGC that "we will insist that unanimity remain for […] defence […]".42 
Conclusion 
The primary goal of this paper has been theoretical. The paper has developed an argument 
that links structural features of the international system and foreign polices. According to 
the framework, security policies are embedded in a set of constraints and incentives that 
derive from two major sources: the international distribution of power and the institutions 
in which a state's security policy has become embedded over time. Shifts in the distribution 
of power will induce the state to react. Unfavorable shifts in the power distribution will 
induce a state to balance, i.e. to gain autonomy and capabilities relative to the preponderant 
state(s). Its reaction, however, will be constrained by the institutions in which its security 
policy is embedded. Certain features of these institutions contribute to the path-dependence 
of policies. They may make rapid adjustments of security policy costly or difficult and thus 
constrain the state's balancing efforts. 
The illustrations drawn from British and German policies towards ESDP have 
demonstrated how the framework could help to better understand these policies. The 
policies of both states can be regarded as instances of constrained balancing. The main thrust 
of both policies is directed towards increasing autonomy and capabilities relative to the US 
after the end of the Cold War. Their main differences can be put down to the different 
institutional constraints they faced. These constraints were especially pronounced for the 
UK due to its close and firmly institutionalized relation with the US. However, institutional 
links between the UK and the US came under pressure after the end of the Cold War and 
became somewhat relaxed, mostly because the UK could no longer safely expect the US to 
stick to the institutions. Over time this opened the door for a more active British role in 
European defence policy. Consequently the difference between the German and the British 
approach towards ESDP has become much less pronounced over the past few years. 
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